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SUPPORTERS AND UNDERMINERS: REPLY TO CHANDLER 
Richard Bradley 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
r.bradley@lse.ac.uk 
 
In ‘A Defence of the Ramsey Test’, I argued that the triviality results for the Ramsey Test 
hypothesis were misdirected and that we should instead reject one or more of the premises of 
these results. The Preservation condition, in particular, seemed doubtful to me and I offered 
two arguments for rejecting it; one which relied on a commutativity condition for belief 
revision and the other on a general version of Modus Ponens. In his discussion paper 
Chandler contests the significance of these results, though not the broader argument in favour 
of the Ramsey Test hypothesis. Since I concur that neither the commutativity condition nor 
Modus Ponens are incontestable and Chandler does not, I think, deny the need to restrict 
Preservation condition, I won’t have much to say about this part of his paper. Instead I will 
focus my remarks on the more positive parts of his paper and on the general issue of the 
suitability of the AGM framework for modelling defeasible reasoning. 
 
1.  Belief Preservation 
In my reply to Brian Hill’s (2011) earlier critical notice, I argued that we do not want a 
version of the Preservation condition that forces us to retain beliefs that have been 
undermined by what we have learnt. If I initially believe that B but my reasons for doing so 
are undermined by learning that A, I should be free to give up my belief in B even if my belief 
together with A, do not logically entail the falsity of B. Suppose, for instance, that I measure 
the temperature of a glass of water using a thermometer and, as a result, come to believe that 
it is 15 degrees Celsius, but that I am subsequently told that the thermometer has not been 
functioning correctly for some time. I should be free to abandon my belief about the 
temperature of the water even if I did not explicitly hold the prior belief that the thermometer 
was functioning correctly. For I cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all the things that 
I might learn that would undermine my current belief were I to learn that they were true. But 
this is precisely what the unrestricted Preservation condition requires.  
 
The phenomenon of belief undermining speaks in favour of the Acceptance interpretation of 
the AGM model and against the Informational interpretation. On the Acceptance 
interpretation, an epistemic state is just the set of propositions that the agent accepts, perhaps 
because they are sufficiently credible or because they constitute working hypotheses or 
 because they are central to her plans. On the Informational interpretation, on the other hand, 
the agent’s epistemic state is the set of propositions or sentences that the agent knows to be 
true or is certain about. This latter interpretation leaves little room for the possibility of 
learning something that undermines one’s beliefs, restricting it to cases in which one learns 
something that contradicts what one believes (which should be a rare event if one’s beliefs are 
certainties). 
 
On the Informational interpretation, beliefs should be preserved unless contradicted, precisely 
because they are certainties. On the Acceptance interpretation, on the other hand, the 
motivation for preserving beliefs is an economic one. The thought is that it is costly to acquire 
beliefs and that consequently we should not give them up without good reason. Learning 
something inconsistent with what one believes is clearly such a reason, but so too is learning 
something that undermines what one currently believes; for instance by casting doubt on 
evidence which supports a particular belief. So the Acceptance interpretation would mandate 
weakening the Preservation condition to require that upon learning something I should retain 
any current beliefs not undermined by what I have learnt. In this spirit, let us say that a belief 
B is stable under revision by some proposition A of the belief set in which it is contained, just 
in case A does not undermine B. Then the principle I proposed can be formulated as: 
(Stable Belief Preservation) Suppose that 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾, ¬𝐴 ∉ 𝐾 and A does not undermine B in 
K. Then 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 ∗ 𝐴. 
 
This formulation was vague on the question of what it takes for one belief to undermine 
another. Intentionally so, because although a belief being inconsistent with another is surely 
sufficient for it to undermine it, there seems to be no consensus amongst epistemologists as to 
how to characterise this undermining relation more precisely. I did however argue that 
conditionals could be undermined by acceptance of a proposition that was inconsistent with 




Chandler argues that PRES2
∗ is too strong, offering both a counterexample and a technical 
result to support this claim (Observation 6). Chandler’s counterexample is intuitively 
compelling but assumes a concept of defeasibility that I find doubtful (more on this later).1 
                                                 
1 Chandler supposes (i) agnosticism on the truth of factual propositions A, B, C and D, (ii) that A is a ‘sufficient but 
defeasible reason’ to believe B and (iii) that 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 ∗ 𝐴. But from (i) and (iii) it follows by VAC0 and INC0 that 
𝐵 ∈ 𝐶𝑛(𝐾 ∪ {𝐴}). And this, in my view, contradicts (ii) since A cannot be a defeasible reason to believe B given 
K, when they jointly imply it. But B is a non-defeasible reason to believe D, so C cannot undercut D as his 
example presumes.    
 Nonetheless I think Chandler is right to say that PRES2
∗ is too strong. Here is an alternative 
counter-example to it that also serves to illustrate his technical result. Suppose that of the 
horses running this afternoon, I consider only Speedy, Steady and Plodder to be potential 
winners. So I believe that if Steady is not going to win, then Plodder will win if Speedy (for 
some reason) does not. I then learn that Plodder has been disqualified. Should I continue to 
believe that if Steady doesn’t win, then Plodder will if Speedy doesn’t? Of course not, for I 
now know that Plodder can’t win under any circumstances. But PRES2
∗ licenses preserving 
this belief since Plodder’s disqualification is logically consistent with the supposition that 
Speedy won’t win. So what PRES2
∗ fails to pick up is that the disqualification undermines my 
belief that Plodder will win if Speedy does not. The upshot is that PRES2
∗ is not the right way 
to make Stable Belief Preservation more precise.  
 
2. Defeasible Reasoning 
One belief undermines another, Chandler suggests, if, having committed to the truth of the 
latter, the supposition that the former is true leads to this commitment disappearing. More 
formally, he postulates that 𝐴 ⋫ 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 ⟺ 𝐵 ∉ (𝐾 ∗ 𝐵) ∗ 𝐴, where 𝐴 ⋫ 𝐵 reads as ‘A is an 
underminer for B’. For our purposes however it is more natural to treat undermining as a 
relation between beliefs within a particular belief set (thus as a ternary relation on belief sets a 
pairs of sentences contained in them). So, in the spirit of Chandler’s proposal, I suggest the 
following characterisation of belief undermining:  
(Undermining) If ¬𝐴 ∉ 𝐾, then A undermines B in K iff 𝐵 ∉ (𝐾 ∗ 𝐵) ∗ 𝐴 
Note the restriction to cases in which ¬A does not belong to K. This is required because when 
¬A does belong to K, revision by A undermines K as a whole rather than B alone. 
 
Undermining, so characterised, may reasonably regarded as the opposite side of the same coin 
to Stable Belief Preservation. While the latter attempts to constrain belief preservation by 
drawing on an unspecified notion of undermining, Undermining draws on an unspecified 
belief revision operation to characterise the notion of belief undermining. Jointly they give us 
what I think we should regard as a basic principle (even platitude) relating conservative belief 
revision to defeasible reasoning: 
(DEF) If ¬𝐴 ∉ 𝐾 and 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾, then 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 ∗ 𝐴 iff A does not undermine B in K 
 
How far does this take us? One might hope that, together with the AGM postulates, it will 
give us the precise characterisation of undermining required, and hence of the restriction that 
should be imposed on Preservation. But alas not, for VAC0 robs Undermining of its interest. 
When A is consistent with K and B is in K, VAC0 implies that 𝐵 ∈ 𝐾 ∗ 𝐴. So A can undermine 
 beliefs in K only when A is inconsistent with K. It follows that if DEF is to serve as a 
regulative principle of defeasible reasoning then VAC must be given up, even for factual 
sentences. And without VAC the vagueness in Stable Belief Preservation remains. 
 
Defeasible reasoning is ampliative: it produces conclusions that are not deductive 
consequences of the propositions we accept. For instance when we infer properties of a 
population from that of a sample, or infer a universal generalisation on the basis of a finite 
number of observed instances of it, we add content to our beliefs beyond that contained in 
what we have observed. Amplification is just the flip-side of undermining. In cases of the 
former we take on beliefs not logically entailed by those already accepted, in cases of the 
latter we give up beliefs that are logically consistent with those we accept. A theory of 
defeasible reasoning should allow for both.  
 
In the final section of his critical notice, Chandler makes a suggestion in this regard that I find 
helpful. Amplification has its source in the possibility of a belief being supported by one or 
more other beliefs, even when the latter don’t entail the former, i.e. of one or more beliefs 
being a non-deductive reason to accept another. Chandler proposes that the belief that A is a 
reason to believe that B just in case, having withdrawn commitment to B, the supposition that 
A leads to the adoption of the belief in B.  In this spirit, but again treating it as a relation 
between beliefs and a belief set, we can say: 
(Supporting) A supports B in K iff 𝐵 ∈ (𝐾−̇𝐵) ∗ 𝐴 
 
The relation of supporting, so defined, is in tension with INC. For INC says that if you accept 
B upon revising your beliefs by A, then B must be a logical consequence of A together with 
your initial set of beliefs. So if your newly accepted belief B is not a deductive consequence 
of your other beliefs, it must have been obtained by reasoning that violates INC. So it seems 
that just as the mark of undermining is the failure of VAC, the mark of amplification is the 
failure of INC.2 
 
Let’s take stock. I think we should take both Undermining and Supporting as regulative of a 
theory that links defeasible reasoning and belief revision. Different candidates for such a 
theory will be more or less conservative in the degree to which they allow for beliefs to be 
adopted and rejected. In an Anglo-Saxon ‘hire and fire’ model of belief revision, beliefs will 
be readily accepted, and equally readily dispensed with, as experience or deliberation 
produces reasons for and against them. In a more Continental model, the barriers to entry into 
                                                 
2 Levi (1996) makes a similar point and backs it up with a good deal more detailed analysis than I can 
give here. 
 a belief set will be higher and those that are already in it correspondingly more entrenched. 
These differences will be reflected in the balance that the models strike between the need to 
accept truths and to reject falsehoods, a balance achieved by calibrating the conditions on 
belief revision, and in particular those for belief inclusion and exclusion, to the adopted 
consequence relation. 
 
The combination of a supra-classical consequence relation together with INC and VAC 
presented in Gärdenfors (1988) gives a system of reasoning that is more of the Continental 
that Anglo-Saxon variety. What we have learnt from the debate following my 2007 paper, and 
in particular from Chandler’s contribution, is that this system does not leave enough space for 
defeasible reasoning. Not just because it is inconsistent with Ramsey Test hypothesis but 
because it reduces the relations of undermining and support between beliefs to cases of 
logical inconsistency and logical entailment. The cost of such conservativism is two-fold: 
restricted opportunities to adopt useful beliefs and the burden of entrenched poor beliefs still 
awaiting decisive refutation. 3 
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